IMEC’s announcement during the G20 summit in New Delhi marked a significant step in the

cooperation between its participating countries. Intended cooperation between France, Germany,

India, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United States (US) and

not least, the European Union (EU), shall happen on multiple fronts such as economic integration,

trade, and investment. In short, IMEC aims to establish a more efficient and cost-effective trade

route connecting Asia and Europe via the Middle East to enhance global connectivity and

geopolitical stability. It also seeks to constitute a geopolitical counterweight to China’s and

Russia’s connectivity aspirations and strengthen US and EU global and regional leadership.

The Spice Route faces a number of hurdles, though. First, it aims to establish collaboration

between countries with very different systems, interests, and tensions. The current war between

Israel and Hamas has drastically shown once more how fragile peace and cooperation in the

MENA region are, and it is hard to imagine an efficient rail link between Dubai and Haifa across

the Arabian Peninsula under these conditions. Second, adjacent countries resist this plan. At

present, most trade between Asia and Europe passes through Egypt’s iconic Suez Canal. The

prospects of having parallel rail connections have raised major concerns in Cairo, since IMEC

would potentially not only reduce Egypt’s transit revenues, but might also lower its strategic

importance. For Egypt, as well as the other invited countries Argentina, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi

Arabia and UAE, it will thus be of greatest relevance if they will join the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,

India, China, South Africa) bloc on January 1, 2024, after the invitation was pledged in summer

2023. BRICS’s envisaged enlargement connects to a third concern about IMEC: the contingency

of intensified confrontation with China. A number of seaports along the Pacific and Atlantic coast

are under Chinese management, including seaports in Europe and Beijing, will most likely not

accept having its massive BRI investments endangered by unwanted competition.

Not least, critics question whether there would be enough trade volume to feed both, Spice Route

and Silk Road, with relevant freight volumes to have both networks running at sufficient

operational capacity in parallel, especially in times of economic crisis. Given the latest shortage

in freight capacities with its major interruptions of global trade chains, this criticism seems

nevertheless of less relevance under the current conditions.

Those concerns notwithstanding, IMEC’s sheer existence offers new opportunities for Gulf

countries to deepen and broaden their international connections, trade activities, and eventual

growth and importance. From their perspective, there is much to win and little to lose.